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ABSTRACT 
 
ISSUE OWNERSHIP IN TURKISH POLITICS 
 
Ahmet Arkın 
Political Science, MA, 2015 
Supervisor: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
Keywords: issue ownership, party politics, voting behavior, issue salience, campaign 
manifestos 
 
Literature on Turkish politics includes diverse studies of socio-economic cleavages and 
its effects on voting behavior. However, researchers rarely study the impact of those 
cleavages on political parties‟ policies and communication. The issue ownership theory 
is a trending field of study in the West for the last two decades. This theory argues that 
deep-rooted attributions to parties not only affect the parties‟ perception by voters, but it 
also affects how parties prepare their policies and communicate themselves. This paper 
serves as an introduction of issue ownership theory to Turkish politics and my findings 
suggest that issue ownership patterns are prevalent in Turkish politics. Issue stances of 
party families on different sides of cleavages have become more stable over time. Long-
term issue ownerships help parties to position themselves on different issues, and 
present themselves to the public during election campaigns. Issue salience that is related 
to performance issues, seems to be effective in determining the voters‟ party 
preferences, as well as a part of parties‟ discourses. Further research on all aspects of 
issue ownership theory in Turkey would enable us to understand voting behavior and 
party politics better. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK SİYASETİNDE KONU SAHİPLENİLMESİ 
 
Ahmet Arkın 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans, 2015 
Tez Danışmanı: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler : konu sahiplenilmesi, parti politikaları, oy verme davranışı, konu 
belirginliği, seçim bildirgeleri 
 
Türk siyasi literatüründe sosyo-ekonomik bölünmeler ve bunların oy verme davranışı 
üzerine etkisini ölçen muhtelif çalışmalar vardır. Fakat, bu bölünmelerin parti 
politikalarına ve iletişim stratejilerine etkisini ölçen çalışma sayısı yok denecek kadar 
azdır. Konu sahiplenilmesi teorisi Batı‟da son yirmi yıldır sıkça çalışılan konuların 
başında gelmektedir. Bu teoriye göre siyasal partilere atfedilen köklü bazı karakteristik 
özellikler sadece bu partilerin seçmenler tarafından nasıl görüldüğünü değil, aynı 
zamanda partilerin bunların farkında olarak kurdukları iletişim stratejilerini de belirler. 
Bu tez konu sahiplenilmesi teorisinin Türk politikasındaki uygulanabilirliğine dair giriş 
niteliğinde bir çalışmadır. Tezin bulguları bu teorinin Türk siyasetinde de etkili 
olduğunu göstermektedir. Partilerin farklı konularda aldıkları pozisyonların zaman 
içinde daha belirgin hale geldiği saptanmıştır. Uzun vadeli konu sahiplenilmesi 
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partilerin kendilerini ideolojik olarak konumlandırmalarına ve seçmene bu konumdan 
hitap etmelerine olanak sağlarken; belirgin konularda ortaya çıkan kısa vadeli konu 
sahiplenilmeleri seçmenlerin kararlarında etkili olmakta ve partilere de kısa vadede 
ekstra söylem manevra alanları kazandırmaktadır. Konu sahiplenilmesine dair ileride 
yapılacak kapsamlı araştırmalar Türkiye‟de parti politikaları ve seçmen davranışına dair 
bilgi birikimimizi daha da arttıracaktır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Could any Zoroastrian have such a concern? 
On October the 11
th
 2011, Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, 
BDP) İstanbul deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder stated to the journalists in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly that his party proposed a bill to the National Assembly, concerning 
the removal of the ban on türban 1  and obligation of wearing ties in the National 
Assembly (Milliyet 2011a). His mention of ties went unnoticed, but the word „türban‟ 
became very salient to the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) members. Four days after this incident, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime 
Minister and the leader of the AKP evaluated Önder‟s words in his party‟s 18th Annual 
Counsel and Assessment Meeting‟s (İstişare ve Değerlendirme Toplantısı) opening. 
Referring to Önder and his party, he said: “[…]They do not have such a concern. 
[…]Why are you taking advantage of my sisters who wear türban? […]Could anyone 
whose religion is Zoroastrianism have such a concern?” (Milliyet 2011b). Debates 
continued on both sides with declarations, and accusations of the other party. About a 
month later, Erdoğan this time claimed thatthe religion of the Kurds is not 
Zoroastrianism but Islam; unlike what Abullah Öcalan (imprisoned on İmralı Island 
since 1999, the founder and the leader of the Kurdistan Workers‟ Party [Partiya 
Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK]) claims in his recent book (Radikal 2011). The debates on 
Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Kurds lasted a couple of weeks after the incident. 
This stylized observation is important in many aspects, and makes us ask several 
questions regarding the nature of Turkish politics. “Why does a member of a party that 
rarely mentions religion gives such a declaration on one of Islam‟s hot topics” is a 
question, on one hand; and “how can a political leader be so sure of intentions and 
concerns of other political figures” is a question, on the other. Answers to these 
questions might seem simple, for example by saying that “AKP is a predominantly 
religious conservative party, and wandering on its terrains would naturally irritate its 
                                                     
1 “Türban” indicates a type of veil, which covers all hair, the neck and the shoulders; is pinned under the chin and 
only revealing the face. Although there are various types of covering hair in Turkey, türban is the controversial one 
which is mentioned in the political debates (see Heper [2009, 417–418] for more information on different types of 
covering for women in Turkey). 
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members”, or “BDP has religious members and voters within its party and constituency, 
and therefore it is normal for them to speak up on such an issue”. Both of these answers 
are fair; yet my thesis is that political science literature and Turkish politics field offer 
us insights to elaborate on this topic in more detail. 
1.2. The main goal of this study 
The main goal of this study is to bring new insights for understanding how party 
politics, campaigning, and voting behavior shape each other in Turkish politics. Issue 
politics is a neglected topic in the field of Turkish politics, and often is limited to 
specific monochromic policy analyses. This study in this respect will not only serve as a 
longitudinal analysis of issue politics in Turkey, but will also try to analyze various 
components of the phenomena which are shaped by an interactive relationship between 
the constituency and the parties.  
Another contribution of this study will be to evaluate behaviors and discourses of 
parties in the face of voting public, which is also shaped by various components 
revolving around the issue perception of the constituency. Overall, this study aims to fill 
the gap in Turkish politics literature with an interactive two-dimensional analysis of 
political actors and the constituency‟s behaviors and perceptions. Çarkoğlu (2012) in 
the concluding remarks of his article on voting behavior in Turkey calls for further 
research by stating:  
“In what specific ways are the short-run forces affected by longer-run 
predictions? How are campaigns effective in shaping voter preferences? To what 
extent does exposure to media shape issue positions and economic evaluations, 
which in turn determine party choice? How do longer-run ideological 
predispositions help mediate the influence of media exposure upon issue and 
policy preferences?” (168). 
This study will try to illuminate most of what Çarkoğlu calls for further research, in 
terms of its emphasis on issue ownership patterns in the long and the short terms. 
In the next chapter, I will attempt to delve further into scrutiny of issue ownership 
literature in the world. This second chapter will start with a chronological analysis of 
the study of issue politics in the world, which started in the interwar period and is still 
on the go. And following that, an examination of the development and different 
elements of the more contemporaneous issue ownership theory will be introduced. This 
chapter will also include a sub-section on tracing issue politics in Turkey in a great 
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detail. The third chapter will be about the methodology and data. After briefly stating 
the methodological limitations of this study, I will attempt to draw the methodology I 
will use in my study. Then a thorough description of my data sources will follow. Last 
part of this chapter will discuss my sample, i.e. the topics that are relevant for the 
analysis of the Turkish issue politics. The following fourth chapter will introduce 
findings that will address the relevance of issue ownership theory in the Turkish case, 
and whether my thesis holds. The following chapter will be a discussion on the findings, 
enriched by the recent developments in Turkish politics. In concluding remarks, the last 
chapter of my paper, I will summarize my thesis, and what contributions I have made to 
the literature of issue politics in Turkey. This chapter will end with a call for further 
research on the topic. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Birth and Development of Issue Politics in Political Science 
Literature 
It is fair to link issue ownership to the issue politics, since the former is only a more 
thorough analysis of the latter. Budge (2015) traces the roots of issue ownership to the 
interwar period where content analysis methodology flourished and influenced most of 
contemporary political scientists. The famous Literary Digest incident (where a weekly 
US magazine wrongfully –by far- predicted American presidential election results in 
1936) casts doubts as to the scientific reliability of surveys conducted back then. 
However, content analysis of the newspapers, leaders‟ speeches, and party declarations 
were very successfully conducted; and the data constructed back then are still used in 
studies today. 
Stoke (1963) in his seminal work criticizes the spatial analysis of issues (i.e. Downsian 
issues [Downs, 1957]) and binary content coding, and explains his theory on valance 
issues, where it is impossible to take two different sides –such as corruption. A 
pioneering work conducted in light of Stokes‟ theory is Robertson‟s (1976) analysis of 
British party rhetoric. Robertson showed that parties rarely take very opposite stances in 
face of issues, but more frequently put emphasis on different issues without mentioning 
some other issues. His analysis paves the way to the studies on issue salience. This way 
led political scientists to ask more questions on what the role of voting behavior is in 
parties‟ agenda-setting, and how both interact. 
The most prominent and inclusive study done about this topic is Budge and Farlie‟s 
(1983) seminal research on twenty-three democracies. Albeit not using the term “issue 
ownership”, this study claims that parties have favorable issues that they emphasize and 
try to make public during their campaigns before elections. Budge and Farlie (1983) 
mainly worked with manifestos
2
 and newspaper archives to substantiate their theories. 
                                                     
2
This study also led to the establishment of Manifesto Research Group (MRG) in 1979, which collected 
and analyzed manifestos from OECD countries initially, and later on expanded. MRG eventually evolved 
into Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), and now continues under the name of Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP). 
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Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) explain how voters perceive these issues by using 
the directional voting theory. They argue that intense emphasis of an issue by a party, 
depending on where that party stands on the issue dimension, increase the chance that 
voters standing on the same side vote for that party. As Petrocik (1996) states, 
manifestos are great resources to observe rooted issue ownership of parties, in the eyes 
of the constituency. Budge and Farlie (1983) take a similar stance with Petrocik, and 
add that apart from the deep-seated issue reputation of parties, election issues are often 
cannot be controlled by parties, but are rather exogenous. Petrocik et al. (2003), 
analyzing parties‟ and candidates‟ speeches as compared to newspaper articles and 
public opinion surveys, fails to find causation between parties‟ agenda-setting efforts 
and salience of issues in the eyes of the public. However, party reputations remain, and 
parties selectively emphasize or depreciate certain issues according to their advantages 
or disadvantages (Petrocik, 1996). Analyses regarding the relationship between 
campaigns and voters‟ preferences further catalyzed debates on the causative nature of 
issue ownership and issue salience. 
Riker (1993) argued according to his research that issue association changes from 
election to election, and losers of a competition seek for other issues they could be 
advantaged in upcoming elections. Petrocik (1996) in his article where he coined the 
term “issue ownership” comes up with a theory that has bits and pieces from both 
arguments. He argues that parties indeed own some issues, and have advantages and 
disadvantages in election campaigns. However, equally important other determinant is 
incumbent performance. He argues that wrongdoings of the party that holds the office 
as well as exogenous factors –such as natural disasters or global crises also affect the 
ownership of an issue by a party. Yet, how a party performs in the face of those crises 
cannot be thought on its own without counting in that party‟s reputation regarding that 
very issue. 
So far, the studies we have discussed mostly focus on US and British politics that 
predominantly have two-party systems. Kuechler (1989) argues that most of European 
voters –who vote in multi-party systems, do not have any exact perception or attribution 
of issue association for parties. Two or more parties might be perceived to handle an 
issue better than rest of parties within a country. He further argues that the famous 
Michigan model fails to explain European voters, since measurement of party 
identification, issues, and party roles are different in European party systems (1989: 81). 
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What is more, whereas US election studies are limited on congressional and presidential 
elections, European elections offer a wide range of elections to study –from European 
Parliament elections to local elections, from parliamentary elections to federal elections. 
This variation could also be the case for various combinations of issue-party 
associations, and could be the reason behind the low voter turnout rates in the EU 
democracies. 
Bélanger and Meguid (2007), according to data they collected from Canadian elections, 
state that at this point, it is crucial to separate aggregate level data (issue ownership) 
from individual level data (issue voting). Their claim –not so different than Budge, 
Farlie, and Petrocik, is that issue ownership is important, but issue salience is the main 
determinant behind voting behavior of public.  
Theories on issue ownership also extensively focused on how issue ownership is 
shaped. General consensus is on a twofold issue ownership theory. According to this 
literature, there are long-term and short-term ownership patterns of issues. Lipset & 
Rokkan‟s (1967) seminal study suggests that –although they do not use the concept of 
issue ownership, deep-rooted cleavages in the society determine the relative positions of 
parties and constituencies. Similarly, Petrocik, argues that issue ownerships are 
“produced by a history of attention, initiative and innovation towards these problems” 
(1996: 826). In a similar vein, Klingemann et al suggest, “parties sustain an identity that 
is anchored in the cleavages and issues that gave rise to their birth” (1994: 24). With 
regard to identities that are anchored in the cleavages, another study that is supportive of 
this claim is Stubager & Slothuus‟ (2012) research where they find the party 
identification as the most influential factor as to how voters perceive parties. In other 
words, the relationship between parties and their constituency shape the issue ownership 
of parties; and voters, in a similar vein, utilize their perception of issue ownership of 
parties to decide which party to vote for.  
All these findings explain how issue ownership is born and sustained in a polity, yet one 
must also take into consideration the short-term issue ownership patterns as well. 
Petrocik et al. for instance, claim that reputations of parties with regard to issues are not 
“eternal or even invariant” (2003: 602). Performance factors such as economic 
downturns, foreign policy crises, or even irresponsiveness of incumbent to natural 
disasters might alienate constituency from a party (Petrocik, 1996). Apart from the bad 
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experience with an incumbent government, successful incumbents might also claim 
some issues as their own through their performance. This claim, however, depends on 
the long-term sustainability of this ownership. In other words, parties might have some 
issues “on lease” (Walgrave & De Swert, 2007: 39), yet it takes more than a successful 
recovery to have an issue truly owned by a party. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) argue 
that volatile nature of voters in contemporary democracies makes it even harder for a 
party to own an issue perpetually.  
The last decade witnessed immense increase in articles about issue ownership. Lefevere 
shows that the mention of “issue ownership” in the literature in 2015 is seven times 
more than it was in 2005 (2015: 756). Walgrave et al (2015) suggest that this boom is 
due to the decrease in ideological divides within societies, and simultaneous 
establishment of pragmatic party organizations. The literature mostly focuses on North 
American and European countries, clustering around USA, Canada, Scandinavia, and 
Western Europe. Extending the literature to Turkish politics is about time. This study 
will attempt to do so in the following pages. 
2.2. Issue Politics in the Turkish Politics Literature 
Turkey is with no doubt a unique case. Most of Western democracies never witnessed 
the amount of interruptions in its democratic progression. 1960 and 1980 coup d‟états, 
along with 1971 and 1997 military interventions to elected officials halted democratic 
processes in Turkey; and the new constitutions, laws, by-laws, and even regimes that 
have been introduced by military officers deteriorated the natural democratic 
progression the country might have experienced. The ongoing 10% threshold (also 
inherited from 1980 coup d‟état) is also the highest in Europe and among the highest in 
the world. The road that led to democracy is contemporaneous, but not similar to the 
first full-fledged democracies in the –especially the Western world in early 20th century. 
This section is devised to provide a brief introduction to societal and party cleavages in 
Turkey. 
For the last three decades, majority of studies on Turkish society and politics have been 
under the influence of Mardin‟s (1973) seminal article titled “Center–Periphery 
Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Utilizing Lipset & Rokkan‟s (1967) social 
cleavages theory and methodology, Mardin‟s argument is that the societal cleavage in 
Turkey is a deep-rooted issue, dating back to the modernization efforts of the Ottoman 
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rulers. A Westernized, secularly educated group of rulers, military officials, and 
bureaucrats (center) have set forth a distance between themselves and the rest of the 
population (periphery). This divide eventually resulted in alienation of the periphery 
from the center that created a cleavage within the society that affects every component 
of social life with regard to values and opinions of individuals. He argues that the 
Republic inherited this cleavage, and the conflict the Turkish politics face after the 
introduction of multiparty politics is a result of this rooted clash in the society. His 
further arguments are on the prominence of this cleavage in terms of its continuing 
effects on every aspect of social interactions, from economics to education, and from 
politics to social values. Following pages will discuss the literature that is built around 
Mardin‟s theory, and substantiate its relevance and importance to the theory of issue 
ownership in Turkey. 
2.2.1. Roots of issue politics and long-term issue ownership in Turkey 
From the issue politics perspective, it is logical to start the discussion from 1950 
onwards. The reason is that the first competitive and fair multi-party election was held 
in this year (disregarding dubious 1946 elections), and the benefits of issue ownership 
are reaped –although not sown. Thus, 1950 parliamentary election is of utmost 
importance to understanding the issue politics in today‟s Turkish politics. 
Since its foundation in 1946, the Democrat party already started to affect the political 
discourse of Turkish polity. Mardin (1973) claims that the success of the Democrat 
Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) lies in its campaign strategy it started off in 1946. The DP 
appealed directly to the rural peasants, and framed their daily concerns as their main 
raison d‟être. Wuthrich (2013) quotes Lerner (1958) from his seminal work to show the 
hint the importance of machine politics promises of the DP approaching the 1950 
elections: 
"The Demokrat men came to Balgat and asked us what was needed here and told 
us they would do it when they were elected . . . We all voted for them . . . and 
the new men did what they said. They brought us this road and moved out the 
gendarmerie . . . We are all Demokrat party here in Balgat now." (Lerner quoted 
in Wuthrich, 2013: 763). 
Wuthrich (2013) further claims that establishing relationships with local notables, 
usually through benefiting existing divided structure within local communities, was 
another factor that brought the DP victory in 1950. Pragmatic and structural tactics 
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employed by the DP, however, does not render the issue politics irrelevant for 1950 
elections. 
Mardin (1973) claims that one of the major factors that carried the DP to victory was its 
promise and actions to make Islam and peripheral values and concerns legitimate. This 
is evident in Çınar & Sezgin‟s (2013) study where they show evidence for the organic 
ties between the religious establishments in the society and the DP. In the face of these 
developments, the CHP campaign also slowly employed a peripheral tone. Wuthrich 
shows that CHP appealed specifically to the rural citizenry in its 1950 election 
manifesto, mentioning concerns of villages and villagers almost two times more than 
the DP manifesto: 26,5% versus 13,6% respectively (Wuthrich, 2011: 213-216). He 
further argues that the language and rhetoric used in the DP‟s manifesto was more 
towards the urban dwellers than that of the CHP‟s (2011: 216). In a similar vein, Mardin 
(1973) argues that the reason the CHP relaxed laws on Islamic practices and 
organizations in the late 1940s, was a result of a compensational behavior against the 
DP‟s campaign (also see Wuthrich 2011, 2013). At this point, we should also keep in 
mind that the DP was founded by the four PMs of the CHP, and there were no 
difference between CHP and DP candidates regarding their backgrounds (Frey, 1975). 
Sayarı (1978) also notes that the divide of the DP off the CHP was a result of merely an 
intra-elite conflict, and has no ground with regard to social cleavages. Based on the 
landslide victory of the DP in 1950, we can assume that despite the discursive and 
active efforts of the incumbent CHP prior to the 1950 elections, issues like rural values, 
economic well-being, and moral values (i.e. religion, in this case Islam) were attached 
to the DP rather than to CHP. Unfortunately we do not have survey data regarding what 
shaped voters‟ decision in the ballot box, yet a thorough analysis of the whole multi-
party period suggests that this assumption holds.  
After a long-term bad economic situation in the 1940s due to the Great War –which 
Turkey did not participate, the economic boom of the1950s with the help of US aid and 
a more relaxed global trade structure surely helped the DP establish the image of an 
economic problem solver in the minds of the constituency. It also became very easy for 
rural people to advance themselves economically through patron-client relationships 
(Mardin 1973; Wuthrich 2013) and upward social mobility (Tachau & D. Good, 1973; 
Toprak, 1981). As a reaction to this newly emerging social structure, the already-
mobilized members of the state (i.e. bureaucrats and military officials) developed a 
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closer mindset to the opposition party, the CHP, which resulted in the attack of the 
center in 1960 with a military coup d‟état (Mardin 1973). Although İsmet İnönü (then 
head of the CHP) and other party members stated on several occasions afterwards that 
they do not approve any intervention to democratic processes, the values of the center –
namely Kemalist worldview with a heavy tone of secularism started to be associated 
with the CHP.  
The coup d‟état was not the sole reason behind this association though. As mentioned in 
the previous section, parties are often evaluated through the setting in which they are 
established. The CHP was a party founded by the founding fathers of the Republic, who 
aimed to break free from the Ottoman heritage, and somewhat achieved this goal. Under 
these circumstances, the CHP‟s ownership of center values, either voluntary or 
reluctant, has become a phenomenon in Turkish politics, and an irrevocable component 
of issue politics in Turkey. In Tachau‟s words, the CHP “had difficulty shaking off its 
image as the representative of a haughty and oppressive reform-minded elite that was 
out of touch with the average Turk, particularly in the rural hinterland” (2002: 39). 
Wuthrich (2013) spares a detailed account on the issue politics in the1950s. According 
to his theory, the issue cleavages and voting preferences could not be generalized to 
show a nation-wide cleavage, but rather every local unit had its own cleavages and issue 
perceptions and preferences. The main reason for that is the low level penetration of 
national issues and campaign discourse to rural masses as a result of low level of access 
to mass media tools. What is more, showing that the CHP was more popular in rural 
areas than the DP who gained most of its votes from urban centers (clustered in the 
western Anatolian regions), there were in fact no difference between the profiles and 
backgrounds of people who voted for both parties in this period. He also argues that 
factors other than omnipotent center-periphery cleavage affect voter preferences and 
politics in Turkey, but they are often missed because of the focus on cleavages (2013: 
768-9). However, a closer investigation into studies that are influenced by center-
periphery theory show us that this theory has mostly been used for practical purposes to 
describe voting behavior in Turkey, and has often been subject to change regarding 
what center and periphery stand for.  
Closure of the DP was followed by execution of three of its leaders, a new constitution, 
and foundation of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), often seen as the successor of 
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the DP. In this period, enabled by the liberal nature of the constitution, left-wing 
(Türkiye İşçi Partisi [Turkish Workers Party, TİP]) and right-wing parties (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Action Party, MHP]) were also formed. Following the 
military intervention in 1971, Turkish politics also witnessed the establishment of the 
first Islamist party, Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, NSP). The only 
party that had not affected from any of these interventions and turmoil in the polity was 
the CHP. Kalaycıoğlu argues that up until 1980, all parties that represented the values 
and interests of the periphery were formed and competed against the CHP, and party 
preferences thus represented party identification of voters in the face of this cleavage 
(1994: 406). Indeed, the AP leadership often talked positioned their party against the 
CHP. They were religious in the face of “hostile secularism” (Landau, 1974) and pro-
wealth and pro-property in the face of communist CHP (Tachau & D. Good, 1973). 
Even though Bülent Ecevit, then leader of the CHP claimed that his party‟s hostile 
behavior towards Islam in the past was a “historical mistake” (Mango, 2002: 34), the 
accusations went back and forth from each party to another. The CHP leadership, for 
example, accused the AP leadership for being masons (Ahmad, 1977: 376-7). This 
statement, again, can be seen as a compensational behavior of the CHP leadership for 
the fouls they committed in the past against religious establishments. It can be argued 
that issue positions were taken as opposed to the other party of the cleavage, and 
interest and values of the constituency were often kept in consideration in doing so. 
The period after 1980 coup d‟état is a peculiar case. All existing political parties were 
closed down and their leaderships were banned from doing active politics by the 
military junta rule that lasted until 1983.  Newly formed Anavatan Partisi (Motherland 
Party, ANAP) got the plurality of votes in 1983 and formed the government as a single 
party. Before the elections, however, the ideological stances of parties were blurred and 
there was confusion as to who represented what (Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007: 19-
20). However, Turgut Özal , then leader of ANAP, used some familiar terms in his 
party‟s campaign such as “conservatism”, “economic liberalism”, and “social justice” 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 234). Second runner in the same election, Halkçı Parti (Populist 
Party, HP) was thought to be the successor of the CHP, yet an analysis of the HP‟s 
campaign discourse is missing for making a statement about its stance. Its name along 
with its candidates and its merger in 1985 with the Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social 
Democrat Party, SODEP) hints at its ideological stance. When the ban on politicians 
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was removed and parties were formed again –some with previous names and some 
under a different name, it became even clearer as to which party represents what 
ideological stance. 
Kalaycıoğlu‟s (1994) analysis of 1990 World Values Survey regarding Turkish society 
shows that although the structural (i.e. demographical) nature of the cleavage has 
transformed, the values that shape the cleavage remained intact, affected to a great 
extent by religiosity. Çarkoğlu (1998), in a similar vein, argues that a left-right divide à 
la Turca (Çarkoğlu 2007), along with the center-periphery divide seem to affect voting 
behavior and party campaigning in Turkey. He also argues that the center-periphery 
cleavage has transformed, and analyses of the political agenda suggest that a 
“local/traditional” versus “universalist” cleavage now shapes Turkish polity (1998: 565-
6). He further argues that political disruptions as a result of constant military 
interventions forced voters to vote without any partisan ties, and in accordance with 
ideological proximities (1998: 546). Another important finding unearthed by Çarkoğlu 
is that political parties‟ emphases of issues represent an effort to reflect the cleavage in 
the society on their agendas (1998: 566). This part is especially important with regard to 
my research question and hypothesis, because I shall argue in the next section that lack 
of party identification has rendered issues and issue ownership more important in the 
Turkish case, as it is the sole factor in determining a newly established or an existing 
party‟s ideological stance.  
The structural change in the center-periphery cleavage and establishment –and success 
of Islamist (Refah Partisi [Welfare Party, RP]) and ethnic nationalist (the MHP) parties 
alerted students of Turkish politics to look deeper into what shapes voting behavior and 
party politics in Turkey. Çarkoğlu (2007) analyzes the nature of left-right ideological 
divide in Turkey, and finds that a universal understanding of the left-right divide is not 
wholly applicable to the Turkish case. He substantiates his claim on the place of 
ideology in Turkish voters‟ minds by arguing that left-right divide is simply an 
apparatus that makes taking stance easier for voters, in the face of many issue 
dimensions (2007: 255). In addition to Kalaycıoğlu‟s (1994) analysis that center-
periphery cleavage persists with an increasing tone of religiosity, Çarkoğlu (2007) 
claims that ethnic factors as well as place of residence also started to affect voter 
preferences, and that center-periphery cleavage that is overlapping with a left-right 
divide, along with an ethnic twist could be the best-suiting explanatory factor to explain 
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Turkish voting behavior (also see Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000, 2006; Kalaycıoğlu, 
2009).Then again, it is logical to argue that issues that are assigned to each part of the 
initial center-periphery cleavage seem to be still effective in Turkish politics.  
Studies on issue politics mostly continued to be reflected on the social cleavages in 
2000s. Ayata & Ayata (2002) argue that the void in religious discourse and action that 
is created by center-right parties started to be filled by Islamist (Refah Partisi [Welfare 
Party, RP], and its successor Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party, FP]) and nationalist parties 
(the MHP). Yet, both parties are representatives of the periphery concerning the main 
center-periphery divide. This is in line with Çarkoğlu‟s (1998) findings, yet Ayata & 
Ayata also talk about the reaction of the Kurdish constituency in the face of these 
developments. They argue that Alevi-Sunni sectarian cleavage caused distribution of 
votes along secular-Islamist cleavage line respectively (also see Çarkoğlu, 2005 on 
Alevi-Sunni cleavage and its effects on voting behavior). What is more, a more 
ethnicity-concerned Kurdish constituency reacted to the MHP‟s rise in 1990s and 
started to vote for ethnic Kurdish parties such as Halkların Demokrasi Partisi (People‟s 
Democracy Party, HADEP). As par their analyses, although the cleavages seem to 
increase in number hence complicating analyses, we see a trend towards overlapping of 
cleavages concerning the issue spectra, mostly converging on center-periphery 
cleavage.  
Esmer (2002) also finds that among many independent variables including party 
identification -adapted from the Michigan model (see Çarkoğlu 2012 for more on 
applications of Michigan model and voting behavior in Turkey), the variable that has 
the most explanatory factor is the left-right divide. He further argues that secularism is 
the best explanatory factor for left-wing votes (for the CHP and Demokratik Sol Parti 
[Democratic Left Party, DSP]). Although the DSP‟s leader Bülent Ecevit explained his 
party‟s position towards religion as “secularism respectful of religious sentiments” 
(Esmer, 2002: 111), and although he admitted in 1973 that his party (then CHP) made a 
crucial mistake by being hostile towards religion (Mango, 2002: 34), his party is still 
identified with secularism. This might be evidence to the effects of long-term issue 
ownership in Turkish politics.  
The divide between secular and Islamists camps has deepened in the last decade, and by 
then, “The politicians have mastered symbolisms, verbal and body language, and policy 
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suggestions that maximize their appeal to different cultural blocs (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012: 
7). Kalaycıoğlu argues that although the issues cleavages have deepened, research on 
elections in 2000s suggest that the voting behavior is affected the most by economic 
factors (2012). Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar (2005, 2009), based on two 
survey analyses before and after 2002 elections, show that voters who are affected by 
the economic downturn indeed punish incumbents, and reward successful governments. 
Incumbent performance analysis will be made more thoroughly in the short-term issue 
ownership section (41-51). In a similar vein, Çarkoğlu (2012) finds that Turkish 
electorate is retrospectively pessimistic about their own household, yet prospectively 
optimistic about the economic situation of the country.  
Voting preferences of Turkish constituency seem to be affected by social and 
ideological cleavages to a great extent. A question emerges at this point: how do voters 
perceive parties with regard to these cleavages? Çarkoğlu & Hinich‟s (2006) article 
tackles this question. They find that secular-Islamist divide akin to center-periphery 
cleavage is a dominant issue spectrum in the eyes of the Turkish voters. Another 
dominant issue spectrum is nationalism with regard to Turkish and Kurdish identities. 
Their findings are in accordance with earlier studies. As they also admit, however, they 
did not ask about competence and credibility of parties according to voters (2006: 381). 
This might have been another explanatory factor as to why people vote for one party but 
not for other that are both on the same side of the issue spectra. The competence and 
credibility issue is also central to issue ownership theory, as discussed in the previous 
section.  
TÜSES (Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, Social Economic and 
Political Research Foundation of Turkey) conducted surveys between 1994 and 2004 
with regard to parties‟ capabilities and credibility. Their main findings, among others, 
are that political efficacy of voters is very low, and most of the people do not believe 
that political parties are capable of solving any problem of the country (Erder, 2002: 51-
8). Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu criticize the methodology used in these survey series (such 
as sample selection, question framing, conceptualization, time chosen to conduct 
surveys, and so on), yet they also admit that these surveys are first and only of their kind 
in the time period they are conducted (2007: 169-70). Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu pose 
similar questions prior to 2002 elections, fixing the methodological pitfalls they 
observed earlier, and show that lack of political efficacy continues to be an important 
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determinant in Turkish politics (2007: 154-8). However, both Kalaycıoğlu & 
Çarkoğlu‟s and TÜSES‟ (2002, 2005) research are still important sources to analyze the 
voters-perception aspect of issue ownership theory in Turkey.
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Considering the previous chapter, namely the literature review of issue ownership 
theory, and a longitudinal analysis of issue politics in the Turkish case, I pose three 
questions to better understand the effects of issue ownership theory in Turkey. 
My first question is “in Turkey, do election campaigns of parties focus on the issues 
that a party normally owns, as one expects from the issue ownership theory?” The 
independent variable is the issue ownership of certain parties with regard to certain 
issues. The dependent variable is the election campaign discourse of parties. 
My second research question is “do Turkish voters cast their votes according to their 
issue ownership perception of certain political parties with regard to issues the voters 
hold important?” The independent variable in this research question is the party 
reputations (issue ownership of parties) in the eyes of the constituency, and the 
dependent variable is the vote preferences of the Turkish people. 
My last question is “do political parties respond to issue salience and issue perceptions 
of voters?” The independent variable in this question is the issue salience and issue 
perceptions of voters, and the dependent variable is again the party manifestos of 
political parties Turkey. 
My hypotheses, before testing these questions, are as below with respect to the research 
questions above. 
- During the election campaigns in Turkey, parties focus on issues that are 
advantageous to them.  
- In return, voters make evaluations as to which party to vote for based on the issue 
ownership they perceive of certain parties.  
- Parties emphasize salient issues more in their manifestos according to voters’ 
perceptions of salient issues and party capabilities.
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4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1. Data Resources 
The data that are available and relevant for this study include party manifestos (from 
1950 to 2011 elections), general election results for multiparty period, voting 
preferences of the public, media studies of elections (1995, 2007, 2011), and some of 
nation-wide surveys on party perceptions. However, as stated in the introduction, 
individual-level data sets regarding the media effect on voting behavior (i.e. issue 
salience and voting behavior relationship) is missing for the case of Turkey. 
Methodology section will dwell on this problem in more detail, and attempt to bring 
solutions. 
As we discussed earlier, issue ownership has two components: issue ownership of 
parties (perception of parties and voters: party politics dimension) and issue voting 
(salience and voting behavior dimension). The former is about how parties and leaders 
themselves frame the issues that they think would benefit them and/or harm other 
parties. Perception of voters regarding political parties is also within this domain. This 
component can be found through a research on party manifestos and election/parliament 
speeches. The latter component is about what happens after parties communicate 
themselves to the public, namely; how salient are their issues, and what effects they 
have on voting behavior of the constituency. 
4.1.1.  The Manifesto Project 
For testing the first part of my hypothesis, I will utilize Manifesto Project Database‟s 
party manifesto data. The Manifesto Project started its journey as the Manifesto 
Research Group (MRG) in 1979 by Ian Budge as a Standing Group of the European 
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). From 1989 to 2009, it continued as 
Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) hosted by WZB (Social Science Research 
Center Berlin) and directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Since 2009, it is titled 
Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR); hosted by DFG (German 
Research Foundation), and headed by Andrea Volkens.  
The Manifesto Project database for Turkey ranges from 1950 to 2011. The data is 
classified under seven policy domains: 
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 Domain 1: External Relations 
 Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy 
 Domain 3: Political System 
 Domain 4: Economy 
 Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
 Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
 Domain 7: Social Groups 
As stated above, issue politics literature of Turkey offers us the issues we need focus on 
for testing our hypothesis. However, this database has its pitfalls regarding Turkey. 
Mostly, manifestos of parties that are represented in the parliament are covered in the 
dataset. Thus, there are discontinuities for covering parties‟ manifestos from one 
election to another. For example, DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti), MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi), and ANAP (Anavatan Partisi) have their manifestos covered for the 1999 
elections, but their manifestos are not covered in the 2002 elections. It is fair to say that 
this is a methodological limitation. However, issues covered are consistent, and hence 
provide us room for comparison in terms of patterns regarding the constituency that 
parties appeal to. 
This dataset will also use to test short-term issue ownership theory, evaluated in the 
period between 1999 and 2011 elections.  
4.1.2. Other Resources 
The effects of issue ownership on voting public (voters‟ perception of parties) could be 
analyzed through surveys pre and after elections. Questions that scholars of issue 
ownership theory (in this paper, limited to evaluating short-term issue ownership 
theory) ask at this point include “what‟s the biggest problem of your country right 
now?”, and “which party do you think could handle this problem the best?”TÜSES 
(Social, Economic, and Political Research Foundation of Turkey) provides data 
regarding these questions, for a time period ranging from 1994 to 2004. Ali Çarkoğlu & 
Aytaç‟s (2015) recent general elections report also provides data on these questions 
between years 2002 and 2015.  
4.2. Methodology 
This section will cover how the methodology for our tests and analyses is formed. As 
stated above, the Manifesto Project covered seven issue domains with regard to its 
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coding. Table below is a detailed cascade of those domains, along with their numeric 
codes. 
Table 1. The Manifesto Project issue domains 
Domain 1: External Relations 
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive 
103.1 State Centred Anti-Imperialism 
103.2 Foreign Financial Influence 
104 Military: Positive 
105 Military: Negative 
106 Peace: Positive 
107 Internationalism: Positive 
108 European Integration: Positive 
109 Internationalism: Negative 
110 European Integration: Negative 
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
501 Environmental Protection: Positive 
502 Culture: Positive 
503 Equality: Positive 
504 Welfare State Expansion 
505 Welfare State Limitation 
506 Education Expansion 
507 Education Limitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy 
201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive 
201.1 Freedom 
201.2 Human Rights 
202 Democracy 
202.1 General: Positive 
202.2 General: Negative 
202.3 Representative Democracy: Positive 
202.4 Direct Democracy: Positive 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative 
Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
601 National Way of Life: Positive 
601.1 General 
601.2 Immigration: Negative 
602 National Way of Life: Negative 
602.1 General 
602.2 Immigration: Positive 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
605 Law and Order 
605.1 Law and Order: Positive 
605.2 Law and Order: Negative 
606 Civic Mindedness: Positive 
606.1 General 
606.2 Bottom-Up Activism 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
607.1 General 
607.2 Immigrants: Diversity 607.3 Indigenous 
rights: Positive 
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608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
608.1 General 
608.2 Immigrants: Assimilation  
608.3 Indigenous rights: Negative 
Domain 3: Political System 
301 Decentralisation: Positive 
302 Centralisation: Positive 
303 Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency: Positive 
304 Political Corruption: Negative 
305 Political Authority: Positive 
305.1 Political Authority: Party Competence 
305.2 Political Authority: Personal 
Competence 
305.3 Political Authority: Strong government 
305.4 Former Elites: Positive 
305.5 Former Elites: Negative 
305.6 Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Domain 7: Social Groups 
701 Labour Groups: Positive 
702 Labour Groups: Negative 
703 Agriculture and Farmers 
703.1 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive 
703.2 Agriculture and Farmers: Negative 
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: 
Positive 
705 Minority Groups: Positive 
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: 
Positive 
 
Domain 4: Economy 
401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
402 Incentives: Positive 
403 Market Regulation: Positive 
404 Economic Planning: Positive 
405 Corporatism: Positive 
406 Protectionism: Positive 
407 Protectionism: Negative 
408 Economic Goals 
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive 
410 Economic Growth 
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 
413 Nationalisation: Positive 
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive 
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive 
416.1 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive 
000 No meaningful category applies 
 21 
416.2 Sustainability: Positive 
Source: Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens, March 2014, Manifesto Coding Instructions 
(5th revised edition) 
 
The Manifesto Project database provides a percentage number of an issue within a 
manifesto with regard to the entire text. So, the emphasis a party puts upon an issue 
could be seen more clearly. This will enable us to see a party‟s issue favorability in a 
single election or over a long period of time. 
The parties in the scope for this study are Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party, DP), 
Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, JP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), 
Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP), 
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), Fazilet Partisi (Felicity Party, FP), and Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) for the periphery block; and 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People‟s Party, CHP), Demokratik Sol Parti 
(Democratic Left Party, DSP), and Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic 
Populist Party) for the center block. 1950 and 1954 elections are dropped for periphery 
parties (i.e. Democrat Party) since there is not any meaningful text for these elections. 
Similarly, 1983 election is not taken into account for center parties since there was not 
any representative of center block in this election. For practical purposes, I will not 
include parties who participated in elections less than two times. 
The first reason I selected these parties are because the literature shows that they 
manifest a continuum of each other, and they belong to the one side of the cleavage. 
Also, parties under inspection are those who gained a parliamentary representation in 
their history. Second, at any given election, at most three of them coexist (i.e. center 
parties in 1987-1999 elections), and most of them are short-lived due to party closures, 
coup d‟états, and self-abolition. In cases where there are more than one party at a given 
block, I take the average frequency of the parties in that election concerning the domain 
or parameter(s) under inspection. Third, I prefer to divide blocks as center and periphery 
for the practical reason that I investigate whole multiparty period, and the best way to 
divide parties in two is abiding by Mardin‟s (1973) seminal work where he classified 
the period before 1973 as such, and from which many other Turkish politics students 
derived their theories on societal cleavages.  
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The topics under investigation are selected in three ways. First, the overall analysis of 
the issue consistency will be made. This evaluation will show the general trend of 
consistency in parties‟ discourses, measured by correlation coefficients of all domains 
with respect to each other. Second, topics of “economy” and fabric of society” are 
selected by the author‟s intuition based on the literature that these two topics are 
expected to be playing a big part in parties‟ fixed discourse over time. For instance, 
issues of traditional values, national way of life, or law and order are expected to be 
emphasized more by periphery parties; whereas issues of and around liberal economy 
are also expected to belong to the same block. Considering parties in the periphery 
block have been formed and competed against the CHP (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994: 406), 
parties on the centrist block are expected to show contrarian trends.  
Third, I look at the average frequency of the seven domains separately throughout 1950 
and 2011, and look at the highest three for closer inspection, and also to see its 
difference in time compared to the other block. Table 1 shows average frequency for 
party families throughout multiparty period. This table guides me to investigate political 
system for peripheral block and welfare for centrist block separately under different 
subheadings. Domains of political system, welfare, and social groups will also be 
investigated since they are among the top three topics for both blocks. 
Table 2: Average frequency for party blocks, 1950-2011 
 
External 
Relations 
Freedom and 
Democracy 
Political 
System Economy Welfare 
Fabric of 
Society 
Social 
Groups 
Center 5,25 8,35 15,03 28,90 16,78 4,80 19,95 
Periphery 5,34 6,79 22,52 29,79 12,95 8,17 13,81 
 
Method of analysis consists of two parts. First part is correlation graphs where it is 
possible to see trend lines and ups and downs of discursive changes of party blocks over 
time. Second method is to look at R-values and p-values of the correlations among 
parameters and domains. R-values represent correlation coefficients of variables over 
the multiparty period, and p-values indicate to their significance. Using Pearson‟s 
Linear Correlation analysis, correlations with p-values smaller than 0.05 are thought to 
be significant and topics bearing this value are assumed to have a significant positive or 
negative relationship.   
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Issues around economic performance, corruption, government efficiency (response to 
natural disasters, etc.) are expected to be the short-term issues, and expected to benefit 
the opposition in some cases (2002 elections), whereas benefit the ruling party in others 
(2007 elections). To observe short-term performance of the incumbent, the issue 
ownership related to this performance, and its relation to the cleavages in the society, 
2002 elections offer a very good natural experiment area for us. AKP‟s appeal to the 
public could thus be evaluated both in terms of its response to short-term performance 
of the coalition government of 1999, and its vote share could indicate its relation to 
rooted cleavages in Turkey (left-right scale). A comparative analysis of 2002, 2007, and 
2011 elections could enable us to grasp effects of short-term issue ownership in Turkish 
politics. What is more, a comparative analysis of media between 2007 and 2011 
elections, apart from answering to my third research question (see page 19), could 
support the relationship between issue salience and issue ownership components of the 
issue ownership theory (see page 21). 
Findings from TÜSES‟s (2002, 2005) and Çarkoğlu‟s (2015) research regarding most 
important problems in Turkey, and parties that could handle those problems the best 
will be used to substantiate the findings from Manifesto Project‟s data, and to answer 
my second research question regarding voters‟ perception of political parties‟ issue 
ownership (see page 19).  
Regarding the problem about the lack of data on the media coverage of campaigns in 
the long term (i.e. discourse analyses of sources other than party programs), I will claim 
that party programs are great indicators of media speeches of its leaders and members. 
Alonso et. al.  (2012: 1) state that: 
1. Election programs are either issued by councils of elected party elites or 
legally ratified by party conventions. Thus, they are authoritative statements of 
party preferences and represent the whole party, not just one faction or 
politician. 
2. In all electoral democracies election programs are issued at regular intervals. 
Therefore, programmatic changes can be observed over parties‟ lifetimes. 
3. Election programs cover a wide range of issues. Accordingly, the parties‟ 
preferences towards these issues can be measured and compared to the positions 
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of their competitors within party systems as well as of their sister parties across 
political systems. 
 
They also claim that even though majority of the voters do not read manifestos, mass 
media communicates inconsistencies of speeches / actions of parties versus their 
manifestos. A recent example from the Turkish politics regarding this issue is when 
AKP published its 2015 general elections manifesto, the press (along with constituency) 
that there is not a single word on the resolution process (tr. çözüm süreci, referring to 
the policies for diminishing the unrest among Kurdish people and the rest of the 
society). Ahmet Davutoğlu (Prime Minister of Turkey, AKP deputy) had to explain to 
the journalists that the chapters on resolution process dropped as party members were 
taking it to the print shop (Radikal, 2015). What is more, Alonso et al. also point out the 
fact that research shows parties do 70% of what they preach in their manifestos, which 
is a significant number (2012: 2; Rallings 1987; Thomson 2001).
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5. FINDINGS 
In this section, I analyze the date from the Manifesto Project Database on Turkish 
parties‟ manifestos from the1950 to the 2011 general legislative elections. The first 
section will analyze the discourse of party manifestos regarding issue consistency across 
1950-2011. The hikes and falls will be evaluated in a historical context, and the general 
trend of party discourses will be evaluated. 
The second section will analyze the role of incumbent performance and try to find 
evidence on short-term issue ownership in Turkey. The elections that are analyzed are 
2002, 2007, and 2011 elections. I expect to find that performance issues such as 
economic performance, corruption, and government efficiency (response to natural 
disasters, etc.) cause change in the discourse of political parties with regard to their 
manifestos. Analyses of survey results are also expected to reveal voters‟ perception of 
political parties with regard to these issues.  
Lastly, the third section will analyze the relationship between issue salience in Turkish 
politics and voter preferences in 2007 and 2011 elections. Survey results will again be 
used to substantiate the importance of issue salience in issue ownership theory. This 
expectation is based on the assumption that issue salience causes parties that have the 
best handling capability with regard to salient issues be more successful in the 
upcoming elections.  
 
5.1.1. Issue consistency: a comparison of all domains 
 
Comparing the consistency of issues between elections (Figure 1), although we see 
fluctuations, the trend has been rising for both centrist and peripheral parties, more 
within peripheral parties than the other. This means that parties gradually started to 
stand their ground more than before, with regard to the cleavages they represented in the 
society. Concerning the multiparty period is a recent phenomenon in Turkish politics; it 
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could be argued that parties have been aligning their positions regarding their 
constituencies, which cluster around certain cleavages that affect their voting behavior.  
Figure 1: Correlation of all domains with each other, 1950-2011 
Domains included: External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Political System, Economy, Welfare and Quality of 
Life, Fabric of Society, Social Groups 
 
There are, of course, points where there are dramatic dives and jumps comparing 
elections and regime changes. Overall, for example, post-1980 coup d‟état period has a 
bigger average of issue consistency than the period between 1950 and 1980. One reason 
here could be introduction of the ten percent threshold for parliamentary elections, 
which required parties to have a more popular support to be represented in the 
parliament then they should had had before 1980. Experimenting around issues and 
risking their support they once guarantee might have become strategies they want to 
avoid.  
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Periphery parties‟ nose-diving consistency rates in the 1977 and in 2002 elections also 
call for closer inspection. The former period witnessed the most brutal social conflicts 
in the republican history. Left-right dichotomy‟s “us and them” approach surfaced to 
politics as well, and deemed forming coalitions impossible. Peripheral parties were for 
national way of life (10,9% versus 5,25% in 1973) and positive traditional morality 
(6,2% versus 4,6% in 1973) and unification of the society under elements creating the 
fabric of society; whereas the CHP, representing the left-of-center adopted a more left-
of-center social democratic approach to the conflict and based it on inequalities in the 
society. In the 2002 elections, again, the country had been going through two major 
economic crises and the AKP, a newly formed party coming from a center-right/right-
wing tradition, built its campaign discourse on an effective government (12,7%) and a 
planned (12%), free-market economy (11,5%). Following 2002 elections, the discourse 
on effective government slowly eroded (6,7% in 2007, and 4,5% in 2011), while 
economic planning and free market economy nose-dived (1,1% and 6,5% in 2007, and 
3,3% and 2,1% in 2011, respectively). We see a trend that the AKP leadership put back 
on the dominant discourses of the center parties prior to 2002 elections. 
Tables B and C show coefficients and p-values for correlations between domains. For 
the center parties (Table 3), significant relationships exist between political system and 
economy, political system and welfare, and freedom and democracy and fabric of 
society domains. All these significance is a result of the negative relationship between 
these pairs of domains. In other words, there is a historic trend between these domains 
that an increase in one is reflected as a decrease in the other‟s frequency, or vice versa.  
Topics that construct political system domains are decentralization, centralization, 
governmental and administrative efficiency, political corruption and positive political 
authority. First two issues around centralization are very scarce in center parties‟ 
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election manifestos. The most prominent issues constructing the majority are around 
governmental efficiency and positive political authority, with average scores of 5,3% 
and 6,4% respectively. Although a more thorough analysis of texts would yield better 
results, if we look at the available texts for this parameter (i.e. manifestos from 2002 
onwards), issues within this domain seem to be more related to performance of the 
incumbent, rather positively or negatively, depending on the incumbent. Issues around 
“will of nation”, “political stability”, and “effectiveness” of the incumbent –negatively 
or positively constructs the majority of these issues. Thus, we could talk about a clash of 
interest between two performance issues (economy and political system) when one is at 
stake.  
How and why welfare domain has a significant negative correlation with political 
system is still a question to be answered. One argument could be that center parties have 
chosen to cling on to their long-term favorite issue of welfare when there was not any 
political and administrational efficiency issues to be emphasized, or when they though 
focusing on welfare would bring them more votes in the face of the liberal discourse of 
the periphery block. A similar significant negative correlation also exists between 
peripheral parties‟ discourse shifts on political system and welfare (Table 4). A 
conclusion based on the findings and the issue ownership literature could be that 
incumbency has a great effect on these two variables, both for center and for periphery 
parties. A more thorough analysis would better reveal under what circumstances have 
the center and periphery parties emphasized one domain in the face of the other. 
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Table 3: Center block correlation coefficients and significance of all domains, 1950-
2011 
 
external 
relations 
freedom 
and 
democracy 
political 
system 
economy welfare fabric of 
society 
social groups 
external 
relations 
1,       
       
freedom and 
democracy 
-0,40931 1,      
0,12977       
political 
system 
-0,31671 0,4954 1,     
0,2501 0,06041      
economy -0,21598 -0,383 -0,60712 1,    
0,43945 0,15881 0,01639**     
welfare 0,45143 -0,48829 -0,79702 0,20121 1,   
0,0912 0,06479 0,00037** 0,4721    
fabric of 
society 
0,29074 -0,59036 -0,46601 0,10166 0,45415 1,  
0,29314 0,02051** 0,07998 0,71847 0,08903   
social groups -0,22352 0,0195 0,49908 -0,45485 -0,43163 -0,33584 1, 
0,42325 0,94502 0,05824 0,08847 0,10815 0,22103  
Notes:  
This table presents correlations between all issue domain frequencies of all center parties (CHP, SHP, and DSP) 
across 1950-2011. When there is more than one center party in a given election, the frequency of a domain is the 
average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the 
column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. 
Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
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Table 4: Periphery block correlation and significance of all domains, 1950-2011 
 
external 
relations 
freedom 
and 
democracy 
political 
system 
economy welfare fabric of 
society 
social groups 
external 
relations 
1,       
       
freedom and 
democracy 
-0,40855 1,      
0,11615       
political 
system 
-0,69175 0,38175 1,     
0,00299** 0,14454      
economy 0,06128 -0,25618 -0,35998 1,    
0,82162 0,3382 0,17082     
welfare 0,52769 -0,46539 -0,86112 0,23365 1,   
0,03566** 0,06928 0,00002** 0,3838    
fabric of 
society 
0,52457 -0,26519 -0,35548 -0,19254 0,10252 1,  
0,03697** 0,32089 0,17663 0,47497 0,70557   
social groups 0,02682 -0,10455 -0,36362 -0,27872 0,30909 -0,07097 1, 
0,92147 0,69999 0,16623 0,29587 0,24406 0,79396  
Notes:  
This table presents correlations between all issue domain frequencies of all periphery parties (DP, AP, MSP, ANAP, 
DYP, RP, FP, and AKP) across 1950-2011. When there is more than one periphery party in a given election, the 
frequency of a domain is the average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the 
column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. 
Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
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5.1.2. Welfare and fabric of society 
 
Figures 2 and 3 below show how the frequency of center and periphery parties‟ 
discourses on welfare state and fabric of society have changed –respectively. 
Additionally, the decline in 2002 elections for periphery parties seem to be a result of 
the fact that the AKP has projected itself as a rupture from the National Outlook 
movement of the RP and FP. In this election, the AKP focused more on economic issues 
(39,4% versus a total of 25,6% frequency of center parties in 1999); and among 
economic issues, shifted its dominant discourse from technology and infrastructure 
(12,6% in 1999) to free enterprise (11,5%) and economic planning (12%). 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of “Welfare and Quality of Life” domain, 1950-2011 
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Figure 3: Frequency of “Fabric of Society” domain, 1950-2011 
 
We can also deduce from figures 2 and 3 that the frequency trend for center and 
periphery parties differ as compared to the other. Centrist parties show a rising trend in 
their frequency distribution for welfare state issues in their manifestos. These parties 
also show a more stable trend than peripheral parties, with less dramatic ups and downs 
throughout elections. Also with regard to the fabric of society issues, the CHP‟s trend is 
lower than that of the peripheral parties. Especially 2011 elections is crucial for CHP, 
where welfare state issues rose by almost 12% whereas fabric of society issues 
decreased from 12,3% in 2007 to 5,5% in 2011. The main reason lying behind this 
difference might be attributed to the leadership change the party went through in 2010. 
If we analyze CHP‟s 2015 election manifesto, we again see that the trend of focusing on 
social democracy and welfare and quality of life is still on the go. The reason behind 
this discourse change might also stem from the fact that the CHP gained its highest vote 
share in 1973 and 1977 elections where then party leader Bülent Ecevit adopted a left-
of-center social democratic approach, and eased the party‟s discourse on religion by 
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stating that limitations on religion during CHP‟s single-party era was a “historical 
mistake” (Mango, 2002: 34).  
An argument regarding the issue ownership theory here is that the CHP‟s high emphasis 
on economy and welfare in comparison to fabric of society is not a puzzling 
phenomenon. As the party that is founded by the introducer of secularism in Turkey, 
and as a party that has followed commitment to the founding fathers‟ revolutionist 
principles, the CHP‟s constituency in majority already consists of those who adopt a 
secular way of life. This historical trend deems speaking –negatively or positively about 
the religion and traditional values unnecessary for the CHP, as par the issue ownership 
theory indicates. Rather focusing on expanding its vote share among economically 
deprived constituency by adopting its historical social-democratic and pro-welfare 
stance seems a more rational act for the CHP leadership. The rationale behind this 
preference also applies to peripheral parties. Unless focusing on the issues around fabric 
of society would bring them more votes, peripheral parties would rather not focus on 
these topics. As such, emphasis on fabric of society peaks in 1970s where social 
conflicts brought the country on the edge of a civil war. 
 
5.1.3. Economy 
 
Figure 4 is a more detailed examination into the discursive change of the center and 
periphery parties with regard to economic issues (please see tables F and G in the 
appendix for a more detailed correlation and significance values table for both blocks). 
The correlation between issues that define economy domain of the dataset shows a very 
linear trend for the center parties. The average correlation is around 0.73 throughout 
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multiparty elections, and the parties in this camp, more or less, have not changed their 
stance on 16 different issues that constructs economy domain. The peripheral parties‟ 
correlation is even higher prior to 2002 elections. The AKP, however, almost 
completely changed this trend. The issues the AKP emphasized within economy domain 
has no significant correlation compared to 1999 elections.  
 
Figure 4: Correlation of the economy domain, 1950-2011 
 
If we look more closely at the issues the AKP picked and dropped in 2002 elections 
compared to 1999, we see the biggest decline in the issues of technology and 
infrastructure (from 12,6% to 3,2%), and economic goals (from 7,9% to 1%). The most 
mentioned topics, on the contrary, are free enterprise (11,4%, from 0,05% in 1999) and 
economic planning (12%, from 0,1% in 1999). Although the parameter of “economic 
goals” is specified as “broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in 
relation to any other category” (Werner et al., 2014), closer inspection of the available 
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text (which is for 2002 elections and beyond) shows that they are mostly about topics a 
party achieved in the past. Concerning that the 2002 election was the first election the 
AKP participated in, it is understandable for it to mention less about this topic compared 
to others. Bearing in mind the crises of 2000 and 2001 that shadowed the 2002 
elections, it is also understandable for the AKP to talk more about restraining 
government control on entrepreneurship, and planning a roadmap for the economy to 
take off.  
However, after the 2002 elections, the AKP seems to have gone back to the issues 
which the peripheral parties emphasized the most. On the overall average, the periphery 
parties have given the most space to the issues of economic goals (8,8%) and 
technology and infrastructure (6,4%) among issues within economy domain. The AKP‟s 
discourse on these topics in the 2007 and the 2011 elections are 6% and 5% for 
economic goals, and 7,4% and 14,3% for technology and infrastructure, respectively. In 
fact, technology and infrastructure is the most mentioned economy issue in 2002 and 
2011; and economic goals is among the highest, following free enterprise and incentives 
in 2007, and economic growth in 2011 elections manifestos. Thus, there is an indication 
that the AKP leadership changed the discourse of the party in the face of major 
economic crises in 2002, and turned back to the old periphery parties‟ discourses once 
they hold the incumbency.  
 
5.1.4. Social Groups 
 
Both center and periphery parties performed very similar discursive shifts in the issues 
around social groups, namely positive labor groups, agriculture and farmers, positive 
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middle class and professional groups, positive minority groups, and positive non-
economic demographic groups. Both center and periphery block started off their 
discourse for this domain by emphasizing agriculture and farmers more than other 
issues, and even more than other domains in earlier periods of the multiparty era. 
However, the demographic shift in the country seems to be reflected in parties‟ 
discourses as well. Both parties gradually dropped their emphasis on this issue, yet they 
started to emphasize different topics in time.  
Significance tests show that center parties have chosen to talk more about non-
economic demographic groups and minority groups in a positive way (Table 5). 
Minority groups include positive statements about “the handicapped, homosexuals, 
immigrants, indigenous”, etc. while non-economic demographic groups include 
“women, university students, old, young, or middle aged people” in a positive way. The 
egalitarian policies of the CHP, along with its emphasis in welfare –especially hiked 
during and after the conflict-ridden 1970 era, could be used to explain these phenomena.  
Periphery parties, on the other hand, shifted their discourse towards labor groups and 
non-economic demographic groups, again positively. Especially Islamist parties‟ 
discourse in 1990s on removing the ban on headscarf for female university students had 
been a major factor in this increase, constituting the highest frequency for this issue 
stance compared to others within this domain in 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2007 elections. 
The AKP, again, turning back to agriculture and farmers in 2002 elections, dropped this 
issue and turned back to the trend of center parties in and after 2007 elections. An 
analysis of 2015 elections would yield better results for the continuation –if any, and 
comparison of this trend. 
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Table 5: Center block correlation and significance for social groups domain, 1950-
2011 
 Labour 
Groups: 
Positive  
Agriculture 
and Farmers  
Middle Class and 
Professional 
Groups: Positive  
Minority 
Groups: 
Positive 
Non-Economic 
Demographic 
Groups: Positive  
Labour Groups: Positive  1,     
      
Agriculture and Farmers  0,06197 1,    
 0,82634     
Middle Class and Professional 
Groups: Positive  
0,35537 0,34875 1,   
 0,19365 0,20267    
Minority Groups: Positive -0,44284 -0,74946 -0,42321 1,  
 0,09831 0,0013** 0,116   
Non-Economic Demographic 
Groups: Positive  
-0,3708 -0,70459 -0,07105 0,65436 1, 
 0,17363 0,00336** 0,80133 0,00813**  
Notes: 
This table presents correlations between issue frequencies under social groups domain of all center parties (CHP, 
DSP, and SHP) across 1950-2011. When there is more than one center party in a given election, the frequency of a 
domain is the average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the 
column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. 
Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
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Table 6: Periphery block correlation and significance for social groups domain, 1950-
2011 
 
Labour 
Groups: 
Positive  
Agriculture 
and 
Farmers  
Middle Class and 
Professional 
Groups: Positive  
Minority 
Groups: 
Positive 
Non-Economic 
Demographic 
Groups: Positive  
Labour Groups: Positive  1,     
     
Agriculture and Farmers  0,55001 1,    
0,02729**     
Middle Class and Professional 
Groups: Positive  
0,09925 -0,0256 1,   
0,71457 0,92504    
Minority Groups: Positive 0,07987 -0,39929 -0,64252 1,  
0,76873 0,12548 0,00727**   
Non-Economic Demographic 
Groups: Positive  
-0,29243 -0,56646 -0,36676 0,52799 1, 
0,27173 0,02215** 0,16232 0,03554**  
This table presents correlations between issue frequencies under social groups domain of all periphery parties (DP, 
AP, MSP, ANAP, DYP, RP, FP, and AKP) across 1950-2011. When there is more than one periphery party in a given 
election, the frequency of a domain is the average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the 
column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. 
Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
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5.2. Short-term Issue Ownership 
2002 elections offer a sort of natural experiment ground for short-term issue ownership 
theory. The reason is that the country experienced a natural disaster (August and 
November 1999 earthquakes in the northwest region) and two economic crises. What is 
more, long-term issue ownership traits can also be seen, because a party that is founded 
right before elections could win a landslide victory. Issue ownership of the AKP, and 
issue perceptions of the constituency seem to have played a significant role in 2002 
elections result.  
Table 7 below shows an overview of people‟s perception as to the most important 
problem of the country, and the following Table 8 includes answers of the same sample 
of people as to which party can solve the most important problem in the country.  
 
Table 7. The most important problem of Turkey (2002) 
Problem 
People 
answered 
Percentage 
Expensive life, economy 962 53,2 
Unemployment 434 24,0 
Governance of Turkey 141 7,8 
Exogenous factors 42 2,3 
Education 35 1,9 
Terror, security 30 1,7 
Democracy, human rights 27 1,5 
Corruption, bribery 19 1,1 
Religious problems 9 0,5 
Others 33 1,8 
Not answered 75 4,2 
Total 1807 100,0 
Source: TÜSES (2002: 17) 
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Table 8. Which party can solve the most important problem of Turkey? (2002) 
Party People answered 
Percentage among 
people who indicated 
there is a problem 
Percentage of whole 
sample 
AKP 272 15,7 15,1 
DYP 90 5,2 5,0 
CHP 71 4,1 3,9 
MHP 60 3,5 3,3 
HADEP 59 3,4 3,3 
ANAP 51 2,9 2,8 
Others 69 4,0 3,8 
None of them 808 46,7 44,7 
Not answered 252 14,5 13,9 
There is no such 
problem 
75 - 4,2 
Total 1807 100,0 100,0 
Sample number  1732 1807 
Source: TÜSES (2002: 52) 
 
Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu (2007) also asked the same questions prior to the2002 
elections, using a different sample and methodology. What they found is, however, in 
line with TÜSES‟ findings. In their research too, economic issues were seen as the most 
important problems of Turkey (67,3%), followed by corruption and political uncertainty 
(8,2%) (2007: 154). In their study, the AKP was listed as the most competent party with 
regard to solving problems of Turkey, especially the economic and religious ones (such 
as türban issue [30,3], and moral values [28,2]) (2007: 157). In both research, however, 
people who believe none of the parties can resolve the most important problem they 
indicated is higher than any party value. This could indicate to a lack of political 
efficacy of the Turkish public (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu 2007: 138-9, 155). Çarkoğlu & 
Kalaycıoğlu also conclude, since more than one third of voters who indicated they 
would vote in 2002 elections stated that there is not a party that could solve any 
problem of Turkey, that votes of Turkish people are “not shaped by such issue oriented 
concerns” (2007: 153). To my knowledge, there is not a published version of the same 
type of questions sets these authors have published to make a comparison whether their 
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claim holds valid in a long run. However, at this stage, it indeed seems that vote 
preferences of Turkish constituency are shaped by reasons other than issue concerns. 
TÜSES (2005) repeats the same research after 2002 elections too. The issue concerns of 
voters seem to be intact, with economy issues being the most important problems 
(TÜSES, 2005: 40). However this time the AKP‟s percentage as to its credibility as the 
“problem-solver” increases, and surpasses those who say none of the parties could solve 
problems (47,5% versus 26,9% respectively). Çarkoğlu & Aytaç‟s (2015) research lack 
the data regarding respondents who said “none of the parties could solve problems”, and 
thus we could not make a comparison between two datasets, and arrive at a clearer 
conclusion as to whether political efficacy increased or not.  
It is necessary to remind at this point that both research mentioned above asked 
questions about the current concerns of the voters circa November 2002. Because of this 
reason, they can be regarded as measuring performance issues of the incumbent rather 
than long-term issue ownership of parties; nor do they measure issues related to 
longitudinal issue cleavages in Turkish politics. Systematic collection of data with 
regard to general (not only during elections) issue perception of voters would enable us 
to grasp issue ownership in Turkey in a better sense.  
The issues that voters stated as important also tell about the salient issues back in late 
2002. At this point I expect to find a correlation between the important (salient) issues 
and issues that parties emphasized with regard to their ownership patterns. In other 
words, responses to “the most important problem of Turkey” would be salient issues in 
the eyes of the constituency, and parties are expected to respond to these salient issues. 
Analyses in the following pages will compare 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections, and try to 
find evidence as to performance issues and how they shape party discourses.  
The line plot below (Figure 5) shows changes in the frequency of planned economy 
issue (per404) in parties‟ manifestos from 1999 to 2011 elections. The Manifesto 
Project codebook defines planned economy as:  
“Favorable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government. 
May be:  
 Policy plans, strategies, policy patterns etc.;  
 Of a consultative or indicative nature.” (2015: 21).  
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Frequency of economic planning (positive)in AKP‟s 2002 manifesto is around 12%. We 
also see that CHP increased its frequency in terms of planned economy from 3.75% in 
1999 to 6.25% in 2002, but still, this frequency is almost the half of AKP‟s. Other 
interesting finding is that AKP‟s score is way higher than that of FP (Fazilet Partisi) in 
1999, the party that a significant numbers of people left to form AKP. This clearly 
indicates the bad economic performance of the incumbent coalition government of DSP, 
MHP, and ANAP forced parties, especially the AKP to formulate an issue position 
based on bad economic conditions. Another interesting deduction from this graph is that 
unless there are bad economic performances in a country, parties do not prefer talk 
about their economic plans. This is evident in the simultaneous fall of the mention to 
planned economy in the AKP‟s and CHP‟s discourses in 2007 elections.  
 
Figure 5: Frequency of planned economy: positive (per404) indicator, 1999-2011 
 
 
It also seems that once held the office, AKP‟s discourse on planned economy witnessed 
a decline from a frequency level from 0.12 in 2002 to around 0.02 in 2007. It is only 
after the global crisis (that started in 2007 in the US, and affected the world between 
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2008 and 2011) hit Turkey, did the discourse of AKP on planned economy increased 
again. MHP also seem to have a rising trend compared to its 2007 manifesto. This might 
stem from its place as an opposition party. Meanwhile, CHP –which was also an 
opposition party in 2011, chose to mention planned economy less than it did in 2007. 
There might be several reasons for this behavior; first explanation could be that with the 
leadership change, the party might have turned to its core values such as social 
democratic (left-of-center) issues. Figures6, 7, 8 below show CHP‟s discourse change 
concerning welfare state issues in comparison with the AKP and the MHP. These 
figures are clear indication of the CHP leadership‟s attempts to reclaim (or re-own) the 
issues they once emphasized. The June 2015 elections and the CHP‟s highly welfare-
oriented campaigning also show that this pattern continues. 
A second explanation would be that from a short-term performance point of view, the 
economy did well under AKP between 2002 and 2007 (Bacik, 2008). Putting more 
emphasis on economy (other than left-of-center welfare state issues) would not benefit 
CHP, since this would raise concerns in constituency‟s mind regarding their sincerity 
(Jensen, 2010; Wagner, M & Meyer, T.M., 2015). As Petrocik also argues, attempts at 
“hijacking” an issue do not fare well if the incumbent is successful in that particular 
issue (1996).  
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Figure 6: Frequency of equality: positive (per503) indicator, 1999-2011 
 
 
Figure 7: Frequency of welfare state expansion (per504) indicator, 1999-2011 
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Figure 8: Frequency of education expansion (per506) indicator, 1999-2011 
 
 
The AKP‟s planned economy discourse experienced a decline in 2007, compared to 
2002 elections. At this point, if we look at the indicator “economic goals” (per408, 
figure 9), we see a huge incline in AKP‟s discourse. The Manifesto Project handbook 
defines this parameter as: 
“Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any 
other category. General economic statements that fail to include any specific 
goal.” (2015, 21) 
We should be cautious at this point, because the definition does not tell anything about 
the content. If we look at the coded text for this category, we see that this parameter, in 
Turkish case, explains the past achievements of a party. In this case, this huge frequency 
incline is a result of AKP‟s mention of its economic deeds –in a positive way in 5 years. 
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Figure 9: Frequency of economic goals (per408) indicator, 1999-2011 
 
 
This clearly indicates that AKP, in the absence of any economic downturn, chooses to 
talk about its ownership over the good-performing economy. With the economic crisis 
that occurred right after 2007 elections and lasted until 2011, AKP‟s discourse again 
shifts to its economic plans that brought them victory in 2002 elections. 
Lastly, terrorism also seems to be an effective issue for the elections in the period we 
study short-term effects. Figure10 shows the parameter “military: positive” (per104) 
frequency in the given period. The codebook define this parameter as  
“The importance of external security and defence. May include statements  
concerning:  
 The need to maintain or increase military expenditure;  
 The need to secure adequate manpower in the military;  
 The need to modernise armed forces and improve military 
strength;  
 The need for rearmament and self-defence; 
 The need to keep military treaty obligations.” (2014: 16-7) 
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Figure 10: Frequency of military: positive (per104) indicator, 1999-2011 
 
 
This again, just like economic goals parameter, is a tricky concept for Turkish case. If 
we look at the texts that are as falling under this parameter, we see that the security 
threats the parties mean are actually internal security threats issues, such as the Kurdish 
insurgency. Skyrocketing of the issue frequency in 2007 elections, and the MHP‟s 
access to parliament as a result of the salience of this issue begins to make sense after 
this evaluation. The CHP, as discussed earlier, adopted a more relaxed tone towards 
issues of periphery in terms of traditional values, and turned to its economic tone as a 
left-of-center party, after it experienced a leadership change. So a decline in the CHP‟s 
emphasis of positive military issues is also comprehensible. It is peculiar, however, why 
the MHP chose to mention less of this issue in 2011 than it did in 2007, and why it is 
the other way around for the AKP. 
As a final point in short-term issue ownership section, let us look at the importance of 
issue salience and the correlation between salience and party discourses. I created the 
Table 8below based on Çarkoğlu & Aytaç‟s (2015) report on pre-election survey in 
May 2015, prior to June 2015 elections. The numbers are percentages, and are rough 
estimates deducted from the line graphs they provided in the document they published 
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online. This is a great resource, since it shows issue concerns of voters in a comparative 
way (from 2002 to 2015 elections). The questions they asked are in line with the 
questions regarding voters‟ perception of parties and most important issues, as we 
discussed above (41-3). I grouped issues under the categories we have discussed 
throughout the short-term issue ownership section. So namely, the categories are 
economic performance and terrorism. 
 
Table 9. The most important problem of Turkey (2002-2011) 
 2002 2007 2011 
Economic performance 77 40 60 
Terrorism 1,4* 23 20 
Source: Çarkoğlu & Aytaç (2015) 
*: taken from Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 154) 
 
When we compare these data to our earlier discussion with the data from the Manifesto 
Project, we see a positive relationship between two. Rise and fall of the salience of 
issues in the eyes of the public is reflected as the rise and fall of parties‟ discourse 
regarding these issues. Further analyses with regard to issue coverage of media, and 
media‟s effect on shaping issue perceptions of public will reveal better insights about 
performance issues. The recent literature on election coverage of media (Balkir et al., 
2008; Toker, 2015; Somer: 2010, 2011) does not give such an insight, and they are 
mostly focused on issue cleavages and newspapers‟ tones towards campaigns. However, 
as discussed earlier, Alonso et al.‟s (2012) discussion on how parties reflect their 
manifestos in their campaigns enable us to make assumptions on the relationship among 
the party manifestos, media coverage, and voter preferences, -at least for the time being, 
and within the limited scope of this paper.
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6. DISCUSSION 
This thesis endeavored to provide a descriptive account for the presence and 
applicability of issue ownership theory in Turkey. Analyses show us that issue 
ownership with regard to parties is not prevalent in the Turkish case unlike the US and 
Western European democracies. The literature findings rather suggest that the volatile 
nature of Turkish party system made performance issues more important determinants 
than long-term issue ownerships. However, long-term issue ownership with regard to 
social cleavages (rather than to parties) is also an important phenomenon. Although the 
volatility has been decreasing in the last decade, the upward trend towards stabilization 
of issues on different social cleavages (or as what I named them after Mardin‟s words, a 
dichotomous center-periphery cleavage) is still on the go. Whether this would be a 
permanent trend is a good question to ask at this point. 
To go into more detail, findings suggest that both center and periphery parties have been 
going towards more consistent issue positions. The fluctuations still remain, but major 
breaks occur during times of crises, and the discourses of parties seem to be shifting 
back to the original issue positions once the crisis is over. Being an incumbent or in the 
opposition also have effects on some issue positions of parties. Although some issues 
erode over time (e.g. agriculture and farmers) or some issues are even nonexistent 
throughout multiparty era (e.g. positive Marxist analysis), we see that these erosions and 
absences stem from demographic changes and political nature the country has been in. 
One must not forget that the dataset I use is structured to allow for comparison among 
many different countries. Some issues are overly abstract for our subject matter, and 
some have very different connotations in the Turkish case. 
 In his 1998 study, Çarkoğlu found that pre-1980 stability and consistency with regard 
to issue emphases in manifestos was higher than post-1980 period up until 1995 
elections. Findings in my thesis show a trend in the contrary in as of 2011. These 
differences apparently stem from the changes in party system between 1995 and 2011. 
The AKP‟s rise to power and its establishment of a pre-dominant party system is clearly 
a game-changer. The high volatility in Turkish politics in 2000s (Sayarı, 2007) has been 
halted and put on decline especially after 2011 elections where the AKP victory brought 
with it a dominant party system (Çarkoğlu 2011). Coupled with Kalaycıoğlu‟s 
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kulturkampf theory (2012), it could be argued that polarization in the society is not only 
on cultural level, but party system and issue positions of parties also seem to have been 
consolidating on different ends. There are many cleavages in the literature where we 
could group parties under, yet these cleavages resemble each other in terms of their 
dichotomous nature and the issues they have been assigned to them. 
Turkish party system is indeed very different than US, UK, and European democracies 
where long history of main parties and atypical nature of niche parties allows students 
room for comparative observations. However in the Turkish case, parties come and go; 
yet their stance with regard to issues is pre-defined and thus they could appeal to masses 
even though they are newly established. 55% of PMs in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly are members of two parties that have been established in the last 14 years, 
one of them (Halkların Demokratik Partisi [People‟s Democratic Party], HDP) being 
only 14 months old. Apart from these parties‟ organic ties to their predecessors, their 
stance with regard to issues they own or oppose is another factor behind their mass 
appeal.  
The success of the HDP in the last elections in 2015, gaining 13% of the votes by 
surpassing stable ethnic Kurdish voting which has been around 6-7%, is an interesting 
phenomenon to study, with regard to issue position of the party, and the issues the party 
owns –if there is any. Scholars of Turkish politics have been arguing that we observe 
more and more cleavages in the society as demographic and political climate change, 
yet the trend could very well be on the opposite direction. The future of Turkish party 
system might witness a convergence of cleavages, that is, cleavages would vanish into 
one cleavage that rules them all. Çarkoğlu‟s (1998) local/traditional vs. universalist 
cleavage theory seems to be a good candidate for naming such a phenomenon. Although 
sounding highly speculative, such a trend is not impossible. 
Students of Turkish politics, especially those of party systems and voting behavior are 
highly encouraged to conduct more thorough research on the issue ownership theory in 
Turkish politics. Not only does Turkey offer a unique case where the universal literature 
might expand upon, but it also is a fruitful resource to make comparative studies with 
developing democracies. Issue ownership theory is a particularly unexplored terrain for 
Turkish politics. Fields of research might vary from media studies to retrospective 
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discourse analysis, and from public opinion surveys to statistical analyses of manifestos, 
campaign speeches, leaders‟ interviews, and even tweets.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
Students of Turkish politics have always experienced some complications in explaining 
voting behavior of the Turkish electorate. This hardship stems from the fact that Turkish 
polity could not be compared to other democracies in terms of conceptualization as well 
as methodology. For the conceptualization difficulties, we could talk about a couple of 
anomalies in the Turkish case. First, theories that try to explain social cleavages in 
Turkey by economic factors face with an untypical left-right dichotomy, which is highly 
affected by moral and religious values. Second, theories that argue mobilization in 
Turkish case would cause volatility in voter behavior and in turn force parties to 
converge on issue positions hit the obstacle of increasing clashes between various 
cleavages within the society, or ever-changing party system, all reflected in the political 
arena.  
As for the methodology part, the Turkish case is hard to compare with its Western 
counterparts. In countries like the US and the UK, parties have not changed for 
centuries, and resources to obtain data from are abundant to make longitudinal research 
on politics. In the European democracies‟ case, parties, although not as old as their US 
and UK counterparts, have a relatively long history and issue positions they represent 
seem to be solid. Increase in effective number of parties is merely caused by 
establishment of niche parties that are mostly anti-system and try to alter the political 
agenda (Meguid, 2005). In the Turkish case, however, we see that newly established 
parties are mostly successors of the older parties that are removed from politics by 
“centrist” forces such as the military or judiciary, or they represent a part of a rooted 
cleavage within the society, and appeal to a wider constituency, even trying to become 
catchall parties. Thus, effective number of parties in the Turkish case increases 
(Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 35-38) as politicians position themselves vis-à-vis the 
changing and emerging cultural cleavages within the society. Their aim is not always to 
change the agenda but to convince others that they are on the right side. 
This thesis seeks to employ a methodology that produces comparative and comparable 
findings that situates the Turkish party politics within the context of democracies and 
democratizing societies. Such a methodology also enables us to identify how Turkish 
party and electoral politics compare and contrast with other democratic and 
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democratizing party and electoral politics cases in the world. The most important 
finding is that the Turkish parties are aware of the issues they need to emphasize to gain 
support of a certain type of constituency (as in the case of long-term issue ownership 
theory). Some issues are tied to some parties in a deterministic way, and thus help 
parties shape their campaign discourse accordingly. We also see an upward trend for 
both center and periphery parties regarding their issue consistency throughout time. 
This means, parties –whether rooted or newly established, have been more keen on 
keeping their issue positions. Performance issues, tied to changes in short-term issue 
ownerships, seem to affect voter preferences. Performance issues are reflected in public 
opinion surveys through asking voters what is the most problem that they think which 
the country faces. Parties in return respond to these concerns by focusing more on 
salient issues, not just for the sake of it, but by taking their long-term issue 
competencies into consideration as well.  
Retrospective analytic research on issue perceptions from voters‟ perspective is 
impossible, yet secondary sources (such as interviews of leaderships, campaign 
speeches, press releases, television discussions, address to nation [ulusa sesleniş] 
scripts, and so forth) would be sufficient to analyze the discourses of the political parties 
more thoroughly. Further research will definitely tell us more about the relationship 
between issue emphases of different parties, and establish a better understanding of 
issue emphasis of parties that belong to a particular side of a cleavage. Further research 
are highly encouraged for students of Turkish politics on issue perceptions of voters not 
necessarily during election periods, asking questions on not necessarily the most 
important problems but more general questions about issues and parties‟ capabilities 
with regard to them. Issue ownership theory has been an underexplored terrain of 
Turkish politics and offers a wide array of possibilities concerning further research.
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Table 10: Periphery block correlation and significance for economy domain, 1950-2011 
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sm: 
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Protectionis
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Economic 
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Managemen
t: Positive  
Econom
ic 
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Infrastructur
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Controlle
d 
Economy
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Nationalisatio
n: Positive 
Economic 
Orthodox
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Marxist 
Analysi
s: 
Positive 
Anti-
Growth 
Econom
y: 
Positive  
Free Enterprise: 
Positive 
1,                
 
                
Incentives: Positive 0,41071 1,               
 
0,12833                
Market Regulation: 
Positive  
-0,08013 0,07656 1,              
 
0,7765 0,78624               
Economic Planning: 
Positive  
0,38144 0,19992 -0,11157 1,             
 
0,16065 0,47499 0,69222              
Corporatism: Positive  -0,40771 0,21492 0,05908 0,14515 1,            
 
0,13142 0,44176 0,83435 0,60575             
Protectionism: 
Positive 
-0,3006 0,29534 0,14404 0,02341 0,30031 1,           
 
0,27631 0,28521 0,60854 0,934 0,2768            
Protectionism: 
Negative 
-0,21808 -0,04705 0,23811 0,15846 0,04765 0,51439 1,          
 
0,43491 0,86777 0,39278 0,57272 0,86608 0,04978           
Economic Goals -0,15569 -0,34394 -0,21964 0,17641 0,11092 0,13302 0,04181 1,         
 
0,57953 0,20939 0,43155 0,52941 0,69393 0,63649 0,8824          
Keynesian Demand 
Management: Positive  
0,01965 -0,2506 -0,36937 0,04856 0,06587 -0,26509 -0,26312 0,10412 1,        
 
0,94458 0,36765 0,17542 0,86355 0,81558 0,33965 0,34338 0,71192         
Economic Growth  0,55613 0,494 0,01195 0,06348 -0,13995 -0,35632 -0,27139 -0,56299 -0,12843 1,       
 
0,03133 0,06125 0,96629 0,82216 0,61886 0,19238 0,32787 0,02888 0,64829        
Technology and 
Infrastructure: 
Positive  
-0,02466 0,097 0,01079 -0,18285 0,24338 -0,24989 -0,17087 0,35146 0,16989 0,08318 1,      
 
0,93049 0,73093 0,96955 0,51423 0,38208 0,36907 0,5426 0,19895 0,54496 0,76821       
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Controlled Economy: 
Positive  
-0,26591 -0,23455 0,08458 0,14664 0,04326 0,36699 0,88603 0,34799 -0,328 -0,37694 -0,09869 1,     
 
0,3381 0,4001 0,76441 0,60201 0,87833 0,17844 0,00001 0,20372 0,23267 0,16607 0,72639      
Nationalisation: 
Positive 
-0,2172 -0,03836 0,56733 0,19302 -0,25217 0,43576 0,48691 -0,05278 -0,42648 -0,35014 -0,40056 0,38126 1,    
 
0,4368 0,89205 0,0274 0,49068 0,36456 0,10445 0,06566 0,8518 0,1129 0,20075 0,13899 0,16088     
Economic Orthodoxy: 
Positive  
-0,10513 -0,36921 -0,39618 -0,3252 -0,08379 -0,07816 -0,23198 0,47656 0,46806 -0,45854 0,22992 -0,14868 -0,40028 1,   
 
0,70925 0,17564 0,14377 0,23693 0,76656 0,78188 0,40544 0,0725 0,07848 0,08559 0,40975 0,59693 0,13929    
Marxist Analysis: 
Positive 
-0,19964 -0,28106 0,80076 -0,12079 -0,08083 -0,2012 -0,03475 -0,13904 -0,26413 -0,10755 -0,07631 -0,07948 0,45098 -0,28638 1,  
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Anti-Growth 
Economy: Positive  
0,04383 0,23323 -0,12111 -0,18262 -0,23694 -0,21972 -0,14353 -0,57215 -0,24809 0,73454 -0,01387 -0,24334 -0,11854 -0,30954 -
0,14043 
1, 
 
0,87676 0,40283 0,66722 0,51476 0,39519 0,43138 0,60983 0,02583 0,37265 0,00182 0,96089 0,38215 0,67392 0,26157 0,61766  
This table presents correlations between issue frequencies under economy domain of all center parties (CHP, DSP, and SHP) across 1950-2011. When there is more than one center 
party in a given election, the frequency of a domain is the average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative 
significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
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Table 11: Center block correlation and significance for economy domain, 1950-2011 
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Economic Goals -0,15569 -0,34394 -0,21964 0,17641 0,11092 0,13302 0,04181 1,         
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Technology and 
Infrastructure: 
Positive 
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Controlled Economy: 
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-0,26591 -0,23455 0,08458 0,14664 0,04326 0,36699 0,88603 0,34799 -0,328 -0,37694 -0,09869 1,     
 0,3381 0,4001 0,76441 0,60201 0,87833 0,17844 0,00001** 0,20372 0,23267 0,16607 0,72639      
Nationalisation: 
Positive 
-0,2172 -0,03836 0,56733 0,19302 -0,25217 0,43576 0,48691 -0,05278 -0,42648 -0,35014 -0,40056 0,38126 1,    
 0,4368 0,89205 0,0274** 0,49068 0,36456 0,10445 0,06566 0,8518 0,1129 0,20075 0,13899 0,16088     
Economic Orthodoxy: 
Positive 
-0,10513 -0,36921 -0,39618 -0,3252 -0,08379 -0,07816 -0,23198 0,47656 0,46806 -0,45854 0,22992 -0,14868 -0,40028 1,   
 0,70925 0,17564 0,14377 0,23693 0,76656 0,78188 0,40544 0,0725 0,07848 0,08559 0,40975 0,59693 0,13929    
Marxist Analysis: 
Positive 
-0,19964 -0,28106 0,80076 -0,12079 -0,08083 -0,2012 -0,03475 -0,13904 -0,26413 -0,10755 -0,07631 -0,07948 0,45098 -0,28638 1,  
 0,47563 0,31023 0,00033** 0,66807 0,7746 0,47211 0,90215 0,62118 0,34148 0,70283 0,78693 0,77827 0,09156 0,30077   
 64 
Anti-Growth 
Economy: Positive 
0,04383 0,23323 -0,12111 -0,18262 -0,23694 -0,21972 -0,14353 -0,57215 -0,24809 0,73454 -0,01387 -0,24334 -0,11854 -0,30954 -0,14043 1, 
 0,87676 0,40283 0,66722 0,51476 0,39519 0,43138 0,60983 0,02583 0,37265 0,00182** 0,96089 0,38215 0,67392 0,26157 0,61766  
This table presents correlations between issue frequencies under economy domain of all periphery parties (DP, AP, MSP, ANAP, DYP, RP, FP, and AKP) across 1950-2011. When there 
is more than one periphery party in a given election, the frequency of a domain is the average frequency of all center parties for that given domain. 
Each junction represents the overall correlation between frequencies of the domain in the row and the domain in the column in elections across 1950-2011, and their relative 
significance. Correlation coefficients are in bold face. Values below them indicate p-values of the correlation. 
**: Significant for p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
